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The commission is a tool for action only, the idea that we have been separated from and confirmed by logic is that our body is a tool for action, and a means of action only. In any respect, it is in no way useful in preparing, let alone explaining, a representation. Consideration of external cognition: There is only a difference in degree, not type, between the so-called cognitive faculties of the brain and the anti-therapeutic functions of the spinal cord. While the spinal cord converts the ex received to movements that are more or less necessarily performed, the brain puts it in relation to motor mechanisms that are chosen more or less freely; But that which the brain explains in our perception work began, prepared or suggested, is not perception. Considering memory, the body keeps engine habits able to act past more than again; He can resume positions that the past will enter himself. Or, again, by repeating some of the brain phenomena that have prolonged previous perceptions, it can offer to remember a point of attachment with the actual, a way to regain its lost influence on the current reality: but in no case can the brain (300) store up memories or images. Thus, neither in cognition, nor in memory, nor in the higher achievements of the mind, the body does not contribute directly to representation. By folding this hypothesis beneath its many aspects and thereby maximizing bilateralism, it seemed to us that we divide the body and the soul with an unsurpassable identity. In fact, we were referring to the only possible way to bring them together. Cognition and memory. Physical and mental, not just repetitions of some of the other. All the difficulties raised by this problem, whether in normal binary, or in materialism and idealism, come from consideration, the physical and mental phenomena and memory as one repeats from the other. Suppose I put in a material view of epistemological consciousness: I am completely unable to understand why some cerebral phenomena are accompanied by consciousness, meaning, what could be use, or how it could ever arise, and the conscious repetition of the physical universe I've begun to impose. Suppose I prefer idealism: I then allow myself only perceptions, and my body is one of them. But while the observation shows me that the images I realize are completely altered by very slight modifications to the image that I call my body (where I only have my eyes closed and my visual universe disappeared), science assures me that all phenomena must succeed and each other's conditions according to a specific order, where the effects (301) are strictly proportional to the reasons. I am obliged, therefore, to seek, in the image that I call my body, which follows me everywhere, about changes that must be equivalents but well-organized equations, now deducible from each other of images that succeed one About my body: brain movements, which I drive back in this way, are again repetitions of my perceptions. It is true that these movements are still perceptions, perceptions are possible, so that this second hypothesis is more pronounced than the first. But, on the other hand, we must assume, in turn, that there is inexplicable correspondence between my true perception of things and my potential perception of some brain movements that do not resemble these things in any way. When we look closely at them, we'll see that these are the coral reefs on which all idealism is shattered, there is no possible transition from the system that our senses see to the system we will envision for our science, or, if we are dealing more specifically with the idealism of canonism, cannot move from meaning to understanding. I place the matter on this side, and mind on it, and I assume that brain movements are the cause or representative occasion of things. But if they are the reason, if they are sufficient to produce it, I must retreat, step by step, on the physical hypothesis -302- istic of epithelial consciousness. If it's just her occasion, then I suppose she doesn't look like her in any way, and so, depriving the matter of all the qualities I've given her in my representation, I go back to idealism. Idealism and materialism are the poles between which this kind of dualism will always swing. The error is due to our belief that perception and memory are pure knowledge, while they refer to action now, if we look at what is below these three hypotheses, they have a common basis every three that consider the primary processes of mind; perception and memory to be processes of pure knowledge. What they put into the origin of consciousness is either the futile repetition of an external reality or the inactive material of an intellectual building that is not entirely interested; but they always ignore the relationship of perception of action and memory to behavior. Now, there is no doubt that it is possible to conceive, as an ideal, memory and perception not interested; Do we consider cognition? The increasing complexity of the previous neural system conversions received on an ever greater variety of motor mechanisms, so they simultaneously sketch out a greater number of possible actions. Do we move on to memory? Note that its primary function is to evoke all Past perceptions, which are similar to the current one, remind us of what has already been followed, so as to suggest to us that the resolution is the most useful. But that's not all. By allowing us to intuitively understand in one multiple moments of duration, it frees us from the flow of things, that is, from the rhythm of necessity. More of these memory moments can shrink into one, and the firmer is a contract that gives us the matter: so that the memory of an organism actually seems to measure, above all, its powers to work on things, and to have only an intellectual echo of this power. Let us begin, then, with this energy, as in the true principle: Let's assume that the body is a center of action, and only a duty station. We must see what the consequences of cognition, of memory, and relationships between body and mind. Perception gives us things in themselves. Taking perception first. Here is my body with 'perception centers'; these centers vibrate, and I have a representation of things. On the other hand I assumed that these vibrations (304) could not produce nor translate my perception. It's, then, outside of them. Where is he/she? I cannot hesitate to answer: assuming my body, I assume a particular image, but also with it the compilation of other images, where there is no physical image that does not owe its qualities, or its decisions, in short its existence, to the place it occupies in the entire universe. My perception can, then, be only part of these same beings, but it is in them rather than in it. But what exactly is inside? I see that my perception seems to follow every vibrator detail of the so-called sensitive nerves ; On the other hand I know that spraying their vibrations is just to prepare a physical reaction to neighboring bodies, to draw my default actions. Cognition, therefore, consists in a separation, of the sum of objects, and the possible action of my body on them. Perception, then, seems like an option only. It creates nothing ; Her office, on the contrary, is eliminating from the total images of all those that can have any hold, and then, from all of the ones I keep, everything that is not related to the needs of the image that I call my body. This is, at least, largely simplified, and the way we explain or describe it schematically is what we call pure cognition. Let us know at the same time the intermediate place we represent between realism and idealism. That every reality has a kinship, which is analogy, (305) in short a relationship with consciousness - that's what we concede to idealism through the fact that we're calling things 'images'. Moreover, no philosophical doctrine, provided it is consistent with itself, can escape this conclusion. But if we can assemble all states of consciousness, past, present, and possible, of all conscious We should still have collected only a very small part of the physical reality, because the images outweigh the perception on each side. It is only these images that science and mataviatry seek to reshape, thereby restoring the entire series, which accommodates only a few linkages. But in order to discover between perception and reality the relationship of the part to the whole, it is necessary to leave to realize her real office, which is the preparation of procedures. That's what idealism fails to do. Why is it unable, as we have now said, to pass from a system manifested in perception to a system that is successful in science, that is, from the emergencies in which our sensations seem to follow each other to the inevitability that binds together nature phenomena? Precisely because it is attributed to consciousness, in cognition, rôle speculation so that it is impossible to see what interest this awareness is in allowing to escape, between two sensations for example, and the intermediate bonds through which the second can be inferred from the first. This intermediate and a 306su, so (306) remains vague, whether, with Mel, we make the mediators into 'feelings possible', or, with Kant, holding the infrastructure of the order to be the work of an impersonal understanding. But suppose that my conscious perception has a completely practical destination, it simply indicates, in total things, that what matters to my work is possible on them. Then I can understand that all that remains escapes me, and that, however, all that remains is of the same nature as what I see. My awareness of the article then is no longer either subjective, as is the case for English idealism, or relativism, as for the ideal cantary. It's not subjective, because in things and not in me. It is not relative, because the relationship between the phenomenon and the thing is not the relationship of appearance to reality, but merely the relationship of the part as a whole. The mistake is to create a homogeneous space as a real or even perfect medium before the extension here seems to be back to realism. But realism, unless corrected on a basic point, is as unacceptable as idealism, for the same reason. We have said that idealism cannot be transmitted from a system that manifests itself in perception to the successful system of science, that is, to reality. On the contrary, realism fails to draw the direct awareness from which we have from reality. Taking into view of normal realism, we have, on the one hand, the matter of a vehicle consisting of more or less independent parts, scattered through (307) outside space, on the other hand, a mind that cannot be a point of contact with the material, unless, as the materialists assert, epiphenomenon is incomprehensible. If we prefer the point of realism as a canon, we find between the 'thing in itself,' that means the real, and the 'sensory fork' that we build our knowledge, no relationship, no common measure. Now, if we reach the bottom of these two extreme forms of realism, we see that they are coming to the same point: they both raise a homogeneous space as a barrier between thought and things. Simpler realism makes this space a real way, where things are hanging. Canary realism considers it an ideal medium, where multi-sensitism is coordinated. But for both they are given this means to begin with, as a necessary condition for what comes to commit to it. If we try to reach the bottom of this common hypothesis, in turn, it is to assign a homogeneous space to a tendentious office: space is supposed to either support only physical reality, or have a function, which is still merely speculative, of the furnishing of sensations by means of coordination. The ambiguity of realism, such as idealism, comes from the fact that our conscious perception and the circumstances of our conscious perception in each of them are supposed to refer to pure knowledge, not to action. But now suppose (308) that this homogenous space is not in the forward sense, but in the background of the material things and the pure knowledge that it can have. Suppose the space before space; Then, not only do we have an advantage hypothesis bringing us in harmony with science, demonstrating everything exercising influence on all others, thus occupying, in a certain sense, all of the extended (although we realize from this thing only its center and its boundary marker at the point at which our body stops any hold on it). Not only is the advantage, in metaphysics, of suppressing or reducing the contradictions raised by division in space, - the harmonies that always arise, as we have shown, from our failure to separate the two points of view, the point of view, i.e. the verb from the point of view that is from the point of view. It is, above all, the advantage of overthrowing the insurmountable barriers that reality evokes between the extended world and our perception of it. While this doctrine assumes on the one hand a multiple and divided external reality, and on the other the strange sensations of glorification and no possible contact with it, we find that the concrete tvst (309) is not actually divided, any more than the immediate perception is really untouched. From realism, we return to the point where idealism led us; we replace perception in things. We see realism and idealism ready to reach an understanding when we set aside the hypothesis, not sharply accepted by both, which served them as a common stand. Bottom line: if we assume an extended continuation, in this continuous series, the real action center represented by the body, its activity seems to illumine all those parts of the material that every successive moment they can deal with. The same needs, the same workforce, which defined our body in the material, will also be deducted from distinct bodies in the surrounding medium. Everything will happen as if we were allowed through the filter to work out external things that are real, in order to arrest and retain what is virtual: this virtual work of things on our body and body on things is our own perception. But since the ex that the body receives from surrounding bodies constantly determine, within its essence, nascent reactions, - since these internal movements of the brain matter thus drawing at every moment our possible work on things, the state of the brain fully corresponds to the perception. It is not its cause, nor its effect, nor in any sense its repetition : it just continues it, the perception is our work is practical and a brain condition our work already began. (310) Real work and virtual work. Go to affection and memory IV. But this theory of 'pure perception' had to be both qualified and finished by two points. For the so-called Pure 'percep-tion, which is like a part of reality, completely separate as it is, belongs to an object unable to mingle with the perception of other bodies that of her body, i.e., emotions; In other words, we have, at first, for the convenience of studying, treating the living body as a mathematical point in space and conscious perception as a timely sporting moment. Then we had to return to the body its glorification and to realize its duration. Through this we regained consciousness of its two subjective elements, influence-acted memory. What is affection? Our perception, we said, refers to the potential functioning of the body on others. But our body, being extended, is capable of acting on itself as well as on other bodies. In our perception, then, something of our body must enter. When dealing with external objects, these, hypothetically, separate them from our bodies an area, larger or less, then measured at the time of their promise or danger: that is why our perception of these bodies only indicates possible actions. But the smaller the distance between these bodies and our smaller, potential work (311) tends to turn itself into real action, the more urgent the call to action in measurement and the proportion at which the distance is reduced. When this distance is non-existent, that is, when the body to be perceived is outbody, it is a real work and is no longer a hypothetical procedure drawn by our perception. This is, specifically, the nature of the pain, an actual effort of the damaged part to set Rights; a local effort, isolated, and therefore doomed to failure, in an organism that is no longer able to function except as a whole. Therefore the pain is in the place it feels, since the object is where it is perceived. Between the emotion felt and the image seen there is this difference, that affection is inside the body, and the image outside the body. This is why the surface of the body, the common limit of this and other bodies, is given to us in the form of sensations and image. In this inner sense of emotionality it consists of her subjective. In this exterior of the images are generally their objectivity. But here we are once again faced with the repeated mistakes we have faced throughout this work. It is assumed that there is a perception and a sense of their own. The philosopher attributes to them the function of speculation altogether; Then, profit from the fact that the emotional sensation is vaguely untranslated (because the effort involved is an unclear effort) at one time he declares it untranslatable; It thus judges itself as impossible to explain either when elements of consciousness arise, or sensations arise, which 'lay it as many divorces, or how, unextended, they find their way into space and are coordinated there, or why, in that, they adopt a certain order rather than anything else, or, in the end, how they managed to form an experience that is regular and shared by all men. This experience, the necessary field of our activity, is, on the contrary, what we should start from. Pure perceptions, or images, are therefore what we should assume at the outset. And sensations, far from being the material by which the image is made, then appear as the impurity that is introduced into it, being that part of the body that we project in all others. V. But, as long as we are limited to pure sense and perception, it cannot be said that we are dealing with the spirit. No doubt we prove, as in memory theory is the soul, not a manifestation of article (313) epistemological consciousness, that no cerebral state is the equivalent of cognition. There is no doubt that the choice of perceptions among images in general is the effect of distinction that pertends the spirit. Undoubtedly also the physical universe itself, defined as the sum of images, is a kind of consciousness, an awareness in which everything compensates and revives everything else, consciousness That all the possible parts, balance each other by a reaction that is always on par with the action, blocking each other from standing. But to touch the reality of the soul we must put ourselves at the point where individual consciousness, continue and retain the past in the present enriched by it, thus escaping the law of necessity, a law that states that the past must ever follow itself in the present that repeats only in another form, and that all things must ever flow away. When transferred from pure cognition to memory, we certainly give up the material of the soul. The theory of memory, around which all our work revolves around, must be the theoretical result and empirical verification of our theory of pure perception. That the cerebral states i.e. accompanying perception is neither its cause nor its repetition, and that perception carries to its physiological relationship from a virtual action to action this we can not prove by (314) facts, since on our hypothesis everything must happen since perception was the result of the state of the brain. For, in drainage cognition, the perceived object is the present object, the body that modifies our own. Then his image is actually given, so the facts allow us to say carelessly (although we are far from knowing our meaning equally well in both cases) that the brain adjustments draw the nascent reactions of the body or they create a hi-recurrent awareness repeating the current image. But with memory is otherwise, for memory is the representation of an absent object. Here the two assumptions must have the opposite consequences. If, in the case of the current object, the state of the body is believed sufficient to create a representation of the object, still more should be thought in the case of an object that represents despite its absence. Therefore, it is necessary, in this theory, that memory should arise from the diluted repetition of the cerebral phenomenon that causes basic cognition, and should simply consist of a perception of weakness. In terms of this dual thesis: memory is only a function o and the brain, and there is only a difference x and intensity between cognition and memory.- If, on the contrary, the cerebral state does not in any way generate our perception of the present being but only continues, it may also prolong and turn it into a little work of that we call it, but cannot give birth to this memory. As, on the other hand, our perception of the present being is something of that same being, our representation of the absent being must be a phenomenon with a completely different order of perception, since between presence and absence there are no degrees, no intermediate stages. In terms of this dual thesis, it is the opposite of the previous: memory is another thing of the function of o and in the brain, and there is just no O Degree and, but o and kind, between cognition and remembering. - The conflict between the two theories now takes a sharp form; We will not only summarize here the evidence that we have tried to clarify, but we will not merely mention its basic points. All arguments from reality, which can be invoked in favor of a possible accumulation of memories in corticosteroids, are derived from localized memory disorders. But, if memories are really deposited in the brain, to specific gaps in the memory characteristic lesions of the brain will correspond. Now, in those forms of amnesia that have been a whole period of our past existence, for example, were suddenly and completely obliterated from memory, we do not observe any microcephaly. It is more or less diminished in vitality, as if the subject was more or less difficult to make his memories in contact with the current situation. Thus, the mechanism of this communication was what we had to study in order to ascertain whether the brain office was not to ensure its work rather than to imprison memories in cells. Thus, we have come to follow through the confrontation of the progressive movement that the past and the present relate to each other, the process of recognition. In fact, we found that the recognition of an existing organism may be done in two completely different ways, but in both cases the brain did not act as a repository of images. Sometimes, by totally passive recognition, rather than thinking, the body responds to a perception repeated by a movement or position that has become automatic: in this case everything is explained by the motor device that is usually prepared in the body, memory lesions may result from the destruction of these mechanisms. Sometimes, on the other hand, recognition is actively produced through memory images that come out to meet the current perception; If not foredoomed to impotence, they would not have any inclination to become actual. That's why in all cases where a brain lesion attacks a certain class of memories, the affected memories are not similar to each other by all those belonging to the same period, for example, or through any logical relationship with each other, but simply in that they are all auditors, or all that is visible, or all the image. That's what it is. It seems that the various sensory areas or motor, or, often still, those appendages that allow from being a group going from within the cortex, rather than the memories themselves. We went even further, and through a vigilant study of the recognition of words, as well as the phenomena of sensory aphasia, we sought to prove that recognition is by no means through a mechanical awakening of memories that sleep in the brain. It involves, on the contrary, a high or less stressful degree in consciousness, which goes to bring pure memories into pure memory in order to gradually embody them by communicating with the current perception. But what is this pure memory, what are pure memories? The answer to this query has completed a demonstration of our dissertation. We have just identified his first point, that is, memory is something other than brain function. We had to show, through analysis (318) of pure recollection, that there is no difference between remembering and visualization, just a difference in degree, but a radical difference of the kind. The planes are different from the state of consciousness vii. Let's point out that we start with metaphysics, and no longer just psychology, carry the latter problem. No doubt we have a thesis of pure psychology in a proposal like this: remembering is cognitive impairment., but let's have no mistake: if remembering is just impaired cognition, the reverse perception must be something like intense memory. Now the perfect English germ can be found here. This ideal is to create a difference of only degree, not the type, between the perceived reality of the object and the ideal of the imagined object. The belief that we are building the issue from our inner States and that perception is merely a real hallucination also arises from this thesis. This is the belief that we have always fought whenever we deal with the article. Either, then, our concept of the material is incorrect, or that memory is radically different from cognition. Thus, we have transmitted a metaphysical problem to coincide with a psychological problem that can be solved by direct observation. How does psychology solve it? If the memory of cognition but this perception is weak, it may happen to us, for example, to take a slight sound perception of recoll-(319) -lection for high noise. Now such confusion never happens. But we may go further and say that the consciousness of remembrance never happens as an actual weak state that we try to bring back to the past once we realize its weakness. How, in fact, unless we already have a representation of the past previously lived, can we land to them less severe lyre states, when it is so easy to put them together with powerful states as a more confused present experience beside the more obvious experience of the present? The truth is that memory does not consist of retreat from the present to the past, but, on the contrary, in the progress of the past to the present. In the past we put ourselves in a stroke. We start from a virtual state' that we perform onwards, step by step, through a series of different colors of consciousness, to the goal where they are embodied in an actual perception. That means, up to the point where you become the present, the active state, and in fine, reach that extreme plane of our consciousness against it that stands out our bodies. In this virtual state pure memory is formed. How can the certificate of awareness be misunderstood at this point? How do we make remembering a weak perception, it is impossible to say either why we bring it back to the past, how to rediscover its history, or what right it appears again at one moment and not at another? Simply because we forget (320) the end of the process for all our actual psychic states. Cognition is made into a non-pretentious action of the mind , pure meditation. Then, as it can be clear that pure remembering is something of this kind (because it does not correspond to the present and urgent reality), memory and cognition become situations of the same nature, and between them can not find any difference other than a difference in density. But the truth is that our present should not be known as the one who is more intense: it is the one that works on us and who makes us work. It is sensual and it is the engine; - our present is, above all, a state of the body. It is our past, on the contrary, that no longer acts, may act, and it will act by inserting itself into a present sense from which to borrow vitality. It is true that from the moment remembering occurs in this way, it ceases to be remembered and again becomes a perception. We then understand why memory cannot be the result of a brain condition. The state of the brain is still a memory. It gives it held on the present by the materialism which it grants on it; but that pure memory spiritual appearance. With memory we are really very in the field of spirit. 8- Link and the eighth general ideas. Our task was not to explore this area. When the confluence of mind and matter, the desire (321) essentially developed from seeing one flow to the other, we just had to retain, from the spontaneity of thought, its place in conjunction with the mechanism of the body. In this way we looked at the phenomena of association and the birth of the simplest general ideas. What is the main mistake in associations? It is to receive put all memory on the same level, to receive bases the exceeding or less after which separates them from the present physical situation, to that of work. Thus associations are unable to explain either how remembering clings to the perception that raises it, or why they are linked by similarity or communication rather than any Or, finally, what Caprice is choosing a special recollection among thousands of others that similarity or communication may be attached well to both the current perception. This means that the combination of associations has mixed and mixed all the different modes of consciousness, and they still exist in relation to less complete as less complex recalls, when in fact remember less dreaming, more personal, closer to work, and therefore more able to say themselves like ready-made clothes to the new character of the current situation. Moreover, the opponents of the link have followed to it this basis. They fight the theory because it explains the supreme processes of the mind by association, but not because it misunderstands the true nature of the association (322) itself. However, this is the original vice of the association. Between the work plane - the plane in which our body has intensified its past in kinetic habits, - and the pure memory plane, where our mind keeps all its details in the form of our past lives, we believe that we can discover thousands of different consciousness planes, a thousand integrated and varied repetitions so far for the entire experience we have lived through. To complete the recollection by more personal details is not at all made up in the mechanical juxtaposition of other memories of this, but in moving ourselves to a wider level of awareness, in going away from work in the direction of the dream. The arabization of remembrance is not to include it mechanically among other memories, but to describe, through the increasing expansion of memory as a whole, a circle large enough to include these details of the past. These planes, moreover, are not given as superposed ready-made things one on the other. Rather they exist approximately, with that existence which is appropriate to things of the spirit. Thought, forever moving in the interval that separates them, finds them non-stop again, or creates them a new life of thought formed in this particular movement. Then understand why the laws of association are similarity and communication rather than any other laws, and why memory chooses among memories that are similar or certain contiguous (323) images rather than other images, and finally, how through the joint action of the body and mind general ideas are formed early. The interest of an organism lies in discovering the current situation, which is similar to a previous one, and then in the status of the above and its aftermath in the present case, in order to profit from previous experience. Of all the associations imaginable, the associations that resemble them and their parents are therefore, at first, the only ones of vital benefit. But, in order to understand the mechanism of these associations and above all seemingly a capricious choice that makes memories, we must put ourselves On two extreme planes of consciousness we called it a working plane and a dream plane. In the first motor habits are displayed only. These associations can be called being disposed or lived, rather than representation: here the similarity and contiguity are combined, for similar external situations, as they are repeated, have ended by linking together certain physical movements, and hannahyes the same spontaneous reaction, which unfolds these contiguous movements, will also derive from a situation in which on occasions they have similarity with previous situations. But, as we go from movements to images and from poorer images to richer, similarity and contiguity part company: they end up in sharp contrast to each other on that (324) other extreme plane where no longer has any work affixed to the images. The choice of one similarity among many, from one communication among other things, is not random: it depends on an ever varying degree of memory tension, which, according to its tend to insert itself into or withdraw from the current verb, transfers itself as a whole from one key to another. This dual movement of memory between its two limits also points, as we have shown, the first general ideas, the ascending kinetic habits to look for similar images in order to extract similarities from them, and similar images coming down towards kinetic habits, to integrate themselves, for example, into the automatic pronunciation of the word that makes them one. The generality of the nascent idea, therefore, consists in a certain activity of the mind, in a movement between action and representation. For this reason, as we have said, it will always be easy for a particular philosophy to localize the general idea at one party, to make it crystallize into words or evaporate into memories, when it is really composed in the cross-mind as it passes from one term to another. The Union of The Ninth Body and Spirit. By representing the initial mental activity in this way for ourselves, and thus by making our body and all the pointed end ever moving, ever driven into the future by (325) the weight of our past, we were able to confirm and clarify what we said of the function of the body, and at the same time to create the way to bring the body and mind closer. Because having studied straight pure cognition and pure memory, we still had to bring them together. If pure remembrance is indeed a spirit, and if pure perception is still in question in a sense, we must be able, by putting ourselves in the place of their meeting, to shed some light on the mutual work of the soul and matter. 'Pure,' that means instantaneously, perception is, in fact, only idealistic, extreme. Each perception fills a certain depth of duration, prolongs the pure in the present, and thus shares memory. So that if we take the perception in its concrete form, as a combination of pure The pure perception, i.e. saying about reason and matter, we are pushed within its narrowest limits by the problem of the union of the soul and the body. This is a particular attempt we made in the last part of this article. The opposition to the two principles, in general bilateralism, resolves itself in the extended and extended triangular opposition, quality, quantity, freedom and necessity. If our perception of body function, if we have analyses of pure cognition and pure memory, arc is destined to shed light on any aspect of the relationship between the body and the mind, it can only be provided suppressed or placement down these (326) three opposing. Then we will study it in turn, and present here in a more metaphysical form our conclusions from psychology alone. The first. If we imagine from the extended hand really divided into corpuscles, for example, and on the other hand awareness with sensations, themselves unstretched, which come to drop themselves into space, we will clearly find something in common for such an matter and this consciousness, to the body and mind. But this opposition between perception and issue is the artificial work of understanding that decomposes and is reconstituted according to its customs or laws: it is not given in immediate intuition. What is given are not unforgiven sensations: how should you find a way back into space, choose the place within it, and coordinate themselves there to build a common experience among all men? And what is real is not an extension, divided into independent parts how, being deprived of every possible relationship to our consciousness, can a series of changes that relations and order fully correspond to the relationships and order of our representations? To which is given, that which is a real, intermediate thing between divided spacing and restriction intension, - is what we receive and call the broad. Glorification is the most prominent quality of perception. In the unification and subdivision (327) through abstract space, extended by us to the needs of the work, to form a composite extension and infinitely dividable. On the other hand, in sub-, in making it, in turn, dissolve into emotional sensations and evaporate into the false of pure thoughts, that we get those unstretched sensations that we then seek in vain to reshape images. The two opposite directions in which we seek to open this dual work completely normally before us, because it is the result of the imperatives of action that the extension itself should divide us into completely independent things (where the encouragement to go on the partition extension). And and to we should pass by unins directed to perception (ins tendency to assume perception more and more insind). But our understanding, which of Logical differences are established, and therefore clean oppositions, cast itself in each of these ways in turn, and each follows to the end. It is thus placed up, in one maximum, infinitely dividable attachment, in the other senses which are absolutely denied. He thus creates the opposition which he then meditates amazed. 2. Much less artificial is the opposition between quality and quantity, i.e. between awareness and movement, but this opposition is radical only if we have (328) already accepted the other. Because if you assume that the attributes of things are nothing but non-compliant sensations that affect consciousness, so that these qualities represent, as many symbols, homogenous and calcified changes occurring in space, you must imagine between these sensations and these changes incomprehensible correspondence. On the contrary, once you give up establishing between them, this factitious irregularities, you see the barriers that seem to separate them fall one by one. First, it is not true that consciousness, which has turned on itself, is merely confronted by an internal procession of unforlabeled perceptions. It is within the things that are seen that you put back pure cognition, and thus the first obstacle is removed. You are faced again, tur: the homogenous and calcareous changes that seem to belong to the work of science belong to multiple and independent elements, such as atoms, which show these changes as mere accidents, and this multiplicity comes between perception and its subject. But if the extended division is for only our potential work, the idea of independent calcification is a planning and temporary idea. Science itself allows us to discard it. This is the second barrier. The last interval continues to over-jump: that separates the heterogeneity of traits from the homogeneity of the visible movements that have been extended (329). But, just because we put aside the elements, atoms or what not, that these movements have been glued, we axe no longer deal with that movement that is a moving body accident, with that abstract movement that examines the mechanic and which is not something, at the bottom, but the common measure of concrete movements. How can this abstract movement, which becomes a stalemate when we change our reference point of view, be the basis for real changes, that is, the changes that are felt? How, composed as it is a series of instant positions, can fill the duration that goes more parts and integrate each other into others? There is still only one hypothesis possible; there is still only one hypothesis. It is that the concrete movement, able, like consciousness, to prolong its past to its present, able by repeating, itself, to generate reasonable qualities, already possesses something akin to consciousness, something closer to sensation. On this theory, this could be the same, diluted, distributed over a

greater number of infinite moments, and this same trembling sensation, as we said, like chrysalis inside its envelope. Then the last point to be clarified remains: how is deflation implemented, - deflation is no longer from homogeneous movements to distinct qualities, but from changes that are less homogenous in changes that are more homogenous? This question was answered through our analysis of concrete perception: this (330) perception, the living synthesis of pure perception and pure memory, necessarily summarizes in its apparent simplicity a vast multiplicity of moments. Among the reasonable qualities, as seen in our representation of them, these same qualities are treated as accountable changes, so there is only a difference in the rhythm of duration, a difference in internal tension. Thus, with the idea of tension, we have sought to overcome the opposition between quality and quantity, as well as the idea of an extension between the extended and the extended. Extend and stress i recognize of degrees, multiple but always defined. The function of understanding is to separate from these two races, the extension and tension, their empty container, i.e. homogenous space and pure quantity, and thus the replacement, of soft facts that allow grading, rigid abstractions resulting from the needs of work, which can only be taken or left; Third, however, if we consider the relationships of the extended, in terms of quality to quantity, we will be less difficult to understand the third and final opposition, that is, freedom and necessity. Absolute necessity will be a complete equation for successive moments of duration, each of which is each. Is it with 331 of the physical universe? Can every moment be mathematically extracted from the previous moment? We have throughout this work, and for the convenience of studying, it is assumed that it really was: So let's keep our hypothesis, although it may be necessary to be humiliating. However, freedom is not in its imperio nature. We have said that this nature can be regarded as a neutral consciousness and therefore an underlying consciousness, an awareness held by each other's final manifestations mutually, and nullifying each other specifically the moment they may appear. The first burmese which is thrown up it consciously individually thus does not shine on it with unspoken light: this consciousness is not but to remove an obstacle; It extracts from the whole that is a real part that is virtual, and finally chooses Who cares about him, but though, through this clever choice, it actually shows that he owes the spirit of his form, it certainly takes matter of nature. Moreover, as we watch the birth of that consciousness, we face, at the same time, the emergence of living bodies, capable, even in their simplest form, of spontaneous and unexpected movements, (332) the progress of living matter consists of the differentiation of function that first leads to production and then to the increasing complexity of the nervous system capable of the previous channel and the organization of procedures as the higher the higher centers develop the higher centers becomes more multiplied the dynamic pathways between any other precedent allows the living organism to choose to choose to , in how it has acted. The larger viewing field ever left to move in space - this is actually what it is perceived. What he does not see is the growing tension and timely awareness. Not only, with his memory of previous experience, does this awareness keep the past better and better, so as to organize it with the present in a newer and richer decision; Necessity. Thus, whether we look at it in time or in space, freedom always seems to have its roots deep in necessity and closely organized with it. The spirit borrows from the material the perceptions on which it feeds, and returns it to the matter in the form of movements sealed by its own freedom. Freedom.

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